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ABSTRACT 
Reinsurance is a vital financial device for enhancing underwriting capacity, ceding risks 
and mitigating financial distress. By supplying financial resources and services, 
reinsurance can facilitate growth and expansion in the insurance business. Focusing on 
the insurance sector in the emerging Spanish economy and using a novel dataset on fire 
insurance companies, this paper examines the role of fire insurance in the capital 
formation, the importance of reinsurance as a vehicle for expanding the country’s 
domestic underwriting capacity, and how the capital import impacted on the balance of 
payment, from the introduction of the first comprehensive legislation regarding 
2 
 
insurance in 1908 to the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936. Considering the situation of 
undercapitalization, the singularities of the insurance market, and the changes in 
regulatory schemes, we find that foreign reinsurance became a key financial vehicle for 
increasing the underwriting capacity in Spain. We also show the struggle for an 
emerging market to find ways to keep balance of current accounts and raise capital 
when the financial infrastructure is underdeveloped. The diffusion of reinsurance 
networks from the core of industrial Western countries towards emerging economies 
was one of the mechanisms for financial modernization on a global scale.  
 
 
 
Technologies and devices developed in pioneering countries are expected to facilitate 
the performance of less developed economies.
1
 Latecomers benefit from the diffusion of 
knowledge from advanced economies, generating higher return and growth in the real 
economy. From a financial perspective, the advancement and expansion of financial 
services and instruments in pioneering countries can facilitate the diffusion of capital 
and knowledge for the development of banking and insurance in developing countries.
2
 
Indeed, as shown by Pearson, continental Europe benefited from the insuring experience 
and new instruments that diffused from the United Kingdom in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.
3
 Nevertheless, the lower levels of capital accumulation and the 
fragmentation of the market forced continental insurers to develop new devices beyond 
those complex pools of risk diversification, such as Lloyd’s of London, used by British 
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 Gerschenkron, Economic backwardness and Krugman, ‘A model of innovation’. 
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 Rousseau and Sylla, ‘Financial System, Growth and Globalization’. 
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 Pearson, Insuring the industrial revolution. 
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offices. German and Swiss insurers benefited from new management focuses, and dealt 
with capital constraints by employing innovative financial devices.
4
  
From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, reinsurance was one of the growing 
global mechanisms of financial risk diversification. It became a key financial vehicle for 
enhancing underwriting capacity, ceding risks, and mitigating financial distress in 
Western economies.
5
 In its capacity as a supplier of financial resources and risk services 
across countries, reinsurance early on became a global business.
6
 During the phase of 
industrialization and later, the diffusion of global reinsurance networks met a growing 
need for direct insurers to reduce their exposure to unexpected losses following the 
growth of capital structures.
7
 Moreover, by using reinsurance as an alternative to equity 
capital or accumulating resources, direct insurers could underwrite more risks without 
jeopardizing their financial solvency. Thus, reinsurance serves as an imperfect substitute 
for equity capital.
8
 
Indeed, reinsurance allows small companies and mutual societies to overcome 
their scarcity (or lack) of equity capital and to maximize their market share in terms of 
business performance.
9
 As a consequence, reinsurance serves as an alternative to 
traditional sources of funding. Supplying an additional financial vehicle, the importance 
of reinsurance is expected to grow in undercapitalized economies and/or during periods 
of economic growth when the demand for funding is rising.
10
 In this process, peripheral 
latecomers such as Spain seem to have been highly influenced by the diffusion of such 
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techniques. In barely 40 years of development, the Spanish insurance market managed 
to ride out financial rigidities and capital shortages in such a way that, as the First 
World War drew near, it was able to cover not only domestic risks but also foreign 
ones.
11
 
Focusing on the insurance sector in the emerging Spanish economy, this paper 
examines the determinants of foreign reinsurance demand in the Spanish fire insurance 
market from the introduction of the first comprehensive legislation in 1908 to the 
outbreak of the Civil War in 1936. As in other lines such as marine and life insurance, 
the strong presence of foreign companies and the supply of reinsurance from abroad 
became key elements in providing insurance coverage for the emerging Spanish 
economy.
12
 However, unlike the marine insurance business, fire insurance showed a 
stable foreign presence over the whole period and was less affected by the shock of the 
First World War.
13
 In addition, the weight of fire line in the insurance industry was 
increasingly higher than marine. Figure 1 shows the size of traditional lines and the total 
weight of insurance over GDP, from 1912 to 1934: along with the economic growth of 
the 1920s, fire insurance almost multiplied by five the size of marine market at the end 
of the decade, being one of the main components in the contribution of the insurance 
industry to the Spanish economy. In relation to life insurance, fire line was 
characterized by a more competitive and dynamic business environment.
14
 Moreover, 
the risk structure of life business and the wide use of other actuarial devices as mortality 
tables made reinsurance less decisive for the management of the portfolio. In this 
scenario, fire business in Spain during this period experienced a fast and sustained 
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 Tortella et al., Historia del seguro. 
12
 Contemporary authors noted this importance. For example, Cenamor, ‘El seguro sobre la vida’, xi, 
discussed the dependence of Spanish life insurers on foreign reinsurance as the only way to avoid to 
‘perish without remedy’. 
13
 Pons, ‘A history of insurance’, 158–9. 
14
 Pons, ‘Multinational enterprises’.  
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growth affected by large and concentrated risk pools, which resulted in higher 
dependence on the supply of risk diversification services as reinsurance. 
Figure 1. Premiums earned in the main traditional lines of the Spanish insurance market, 
(million Pesetas, 1928-year price level) (left axis) and weight of total insurance 
premiums over GDP, in % (right axis), between 1912 and 1934. 
 
Note: Data on premiums earned by marine insurance companies are not available until 
1920. 
Sources: Pons, ‘Estrategias de crecimiento’, Appendix 1 and Carreras and Tafunell 
(eds.), Estadísticas Históricas de España, 1339. 
 
The focus on the fire insurance business may be motivated by other reasons as 
well. As shown in previous studies, fire insurance played a vital role for emerging 
industrial economies by supplying both financial protection and indemnity of losses due 
to unexpected risks, and thereby mitigating the unanticipated risk of major financial 
losses associated with investment in physical capital. Also, by insuring one of the major 
collateral securities, fire insurance has been recognised for its importance in supporting 
an important part of the financial infrastructure of capital formation.
15
  
                                                          
15
 See e.g. Pearson, Insuring the industrial revolution. 
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However, in meeting the demand from the emerging industrial economy, the 
Spanish fire insurance sector had to overcome a number of shortcomings. One of the 
major shortcomings was the shortage of capital in the domestic economy. Together with 
the singularities of the Spanish insurance market, and the changes in regulatory 
schemes, this paper argues that reinsurance became a vital financial vehicle for 
increasing the underwriting capacity in the undercapitalized Spanish insurance sector.  
This paper will address the issue, placing the fire insurance industry into a wider 
context, and examining the determinants of reinsurance in line with the following three 
questions; (i) How did the expansion of fire insurance relate to capital formation in 
Spain? (ii) How did the use of reinsurance affect the strong dependency on foreign 
capital imports and, in the end, the performance of the Spanish balance of payments? 
(iii) Was there a systemic preference for purchasing reinsurance beyond firm-specific 
conditions affecting Spanish companies? To identify such conditions, we employ a 
novel and extensive dataset including both domestic Spanish fire insurance companies 
and foreign offices, for which we have categorized firm-specific and systemic 
preferences such as nationality. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 traces the 
historical development of the Spanish financial and insurance sector from the late 
nineteenth century up to the late 1930s. Section 3 outlines the archival records, the data 
used for examining the role of reinsurance in the Spanish insurance sector, and 
descriptive statistics on fire insurance in Spain. Section 4 describes the empirical 
analysis and the key findings regarding the mechanisms underlying the role of 
reinsurance for Spanish insurers. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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I 
The development of the Spanish insurance sector was slow in the nineteenth 
century. The demand for insurance was weak due to the unbalanced national growth 
trajectory, while political uncertainty and a restrictive legal framework presented 
obstacles for joint stock companies to supply insurance effectively.
16
 These difficulties 
resulted in the proliferation of mutual societies along traditional lines as fire and life 
during the central decades of the century.
17
 Most of the companies of this type were 
small local societies featured by the backwardness in managerial practices and a deep 
actuarial lag.
18
 Nevertheless, in the turbulent context of the 1860s, a new legislation on 
stock companies was passed in 1869.
19
 Together with the political stability of the 
restored monarchy in 1875, these changes improved the business environment in the 
latter part of the century.
20
 Far from being a drastic structural change, investments in 
productive assets resulted in a steady trend of growth in the capital stock.
21
 The 
increasing stock of buildings, machinery and transportation equipment triggered the 
demand for insurance coverage. Indeed, the growing needs of risk management devices 
made insurance a key element, supplying capital services to the manufacturing sector.
22
  
Figure 2 shows the aggregated development of the capital stock (1878–1936) 
and the growth in the fire insurance business (1908–1936).23 Dwellings, other buildings 
and infrastructures made up the major components of the stock of capital during the 
                                                          
16
 Frax and Matilla, ‘Los seguros en España’, 191–5, and Tortella et al., Historia del seguro, 88–90. 
17
 Pons, ‘International Influence’, 190. 
18
 Pons, ‘A history of insurance’, 146–8, 158. For more details about technical backwardness in the life 
branch, see Pons and Gutierrez, ‘Actuarial practices’, 11–6. 
19
 Frax and Matilla, ‘Los seguros en España’, 187–8, and Pons, ‘Multinational enterprises’, 90, have 
underlined this change as the starting milestone for the insurance business in Spain 
20
 Prados, El progreso económico, 230, points out the sustained growth before 1929, even though there 
were significant differences between the low rates until 1920 and the great expansion of the 1920s. 
21
 Prados and Rosés, ‘Capital accumulation’, 162, determined an annual rate of growth of 2.3 per cent 
from 1883 to 1920 and 3.5 per cent from 1920 to 1929. 
22
 A similar process for the Swedish case is described by Lilljegren and Andersson, ‘Variation in 
organization’, 79. According to Frax and Matilla, ‘Los seguros en España’, 193-4, number of companies 
in all lines increased from 32 in 1876 to 124 in 1908.  
23
 There are no aggregated data previous to 1908. 
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whole period. Moreover, the expansion since the First World War and the price trends 
made both dwellings and buildings maintain and increase their weight beyond 
machinery and transportation equipment values.  
 
Figure 2. Fixed-capital stock estimates by components (left axis), and fire insurance 
premiums (right axis), (million Pesetas, 1928-year price level) between 1876 and 1936. 
 
Sources: Prados and Rosés, ‘Capital accumulation’, Appendix Table A5, and Pons, 
‘Estrategias de crecimiento’, Appendix 1. 
 
The intense capital formation went hand-in-hand with the expansion of the fire 
insurance industry in Spain. From 1912 to 1932, the size of the market tripled in real 
terms.
24
 As shown in Figure 2, fire insurance kept pace with the growth of the capital 
stock with the exception for the years during the First World War.  
This period of sustained growth coincided with a steady trend in 
internationalization. In the wake of the global expansion of financial business, several 
                                                          
24
 Pons, ‘Diversificación y cartelización’, 570. 
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foreign and domestic insurance companies expanded into the emerging Spanish 
economy. Foreign offices coming from mature markets such as the United Kingdom 
and France supplied a substantial part of insurance coverage in Spain.
25
 Before the First 
World War, in 1912, the fire insurance market was shared between 16 domestic 
companies and 29 foreign offices. The foreign business share was 37%.
26
 The strong 
foreign presence resulted in the profuse adoption of innovative devices and practices 
from abroad: collusive practices in the way of the British Fire Offices Committee were 
employed around the Comité Español de Aseguradores de Incendios, which thus helped 
both domestic and foreign companies to set standard practices in the market.
27
 In 
parallel, French and British societies introduced the use of reinsurance into the Spanish 
insurance industry: in a first step as a way to enter the market; after that, as a mean of 
diversifying their portfolios.
28
 
Together with this openness and the increasing size of the market, the economy 
concealed internal imbalances and systemic shortcomings that hindered the 
development of the domestic insurance industry and paved the way for the entrance of 
foreign offices. Certainly, despite the rates of growth experienced since 1875, the 
Spanish financial system remained underdeveloped at the turn of the century.
29
 Based 
on the five basic characteristics of a successful financial system according to Rousseau 
and Sylla, Spain suffered from a number of structural shortcomings.
30
 Indeed, with 
                                                          
25
 Pons, ‘Estrategias de crecimiento’, 12, and ‘Influence of foreign companies’, Pearson, Insuring the 
industrial revolution, Alborn, Regulated lives and Wilkins, ‘Multinational enterprise’. 
26
 Pons, ‘Influence of foreign companies’, 51. Foreign insurers were registered as branch offices of their 
mother company. They did not declare equity capital, and their only financial support against liabilities in 
Spain were their accumulated reserves, although head offices were expected to back their operations. 
27
 Pons, ‘Las empresas extranjeras’, 200. Pons, ‘Diversificación y cartelización’, 584–5, also describes the 
Comité Central de Compañías de Seguros contra Incendios  as a precedent in the nineteenth century. 
28
 Pearson, ‘Las compañías de seguros extranjeras’, 116-8. 
29
 Malo de Molina and Martín-Aceña, ‘Introduction’, 4–5, and Pons, ‘The main reforms’, 73–6. 
30
 Rousseau and Sylla, ‘Financial System, Growth and Globalization’, 374–7. These features are 
presented as follows: (1) public finance, including its debt management, is run prudently; (2) a stable 
currency; (3) private commercial banks involved in international and/or domestic financial business; (4) 
monetary authority that can act to stabilize domestic finances and manage international financial 
relations, and (5) a well-functioning securities market. 
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regard to 1) public finance and 2) a stable currency, the country’s persistent public 
deficit and non-adhesion to the Gold Standard caused monetary policy to be 
subordinated to fiscal needs, which determined the role of the Bank of Spain.
31
 
Regarding 3) private banking, the central bank was crucial in stabilizing domestic 
finances, but it is also true that its excessive dominance of the whole financial system 
posed obstacles to the internationalization of the banking industry; 4) a monetary 
authority).
32
 Finally, in relation to 5), a securities market), like other continental 
European countries, the Spanish securities market was connected more to public debt 
than to industrial capital formation, which resulted in a relatively low profile in 
quantitative terms.
33
  
Table 1. Financial assets as a percentage of GDP. 
 1900 1913 1929 1938 
United Kingdom 93 103 131 158 
France 96 104 90 130 
Germany 114 158 89 99 
Italy 61 97 95 137 
Spain 37 35 74 81 
Source: Carreras and Tafunell (eds.), Estadísticas históricas de España, 651. 
 
Table 1 shows the composition financial activities over the Spanish economy 
compared to the main European markets. The face values of the country’s financial 
assets were under 40% of its GDP until the First World War, while they were close to 
100% or more in countries like the UK, France, Germany, and Italy. It was not until the 
1920s that the Spanish financial industry began to converge with those of developed 
countries. One of the main components of the system, the banking business, was 
characterized by extreme regionalization, a lack of diversification, and the excessive 
                                                          
31
 Comín, ‘Las crisis de la deuda’, 206-7 and Martínez Ruiz, ‘Papel mojado. Crisis inflacionarias’. 
32
 Martín-Aceña, ‘Spain during Gold Standard’, ‘Crisis bancarias’, and ‘The Spanish banking system’, 
99-103. 
33
 Total capital traded in Madrid stock exchange was below 10% of GDP until well into the 1980s. 
Cuevas, ‘Las crisis bursátiles’, 162–5. 
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dominance of the Bank of Spain. These elements defined a financial system 
characterized by the predominance of commercial banking over other services.
34
 In the 
case of insurance, rigidities in the capital markets developed, with low requirements on 
capital ratios for Spanish societies and an absence of obstacles to the establishment of 
foreign companies until 1893. Consequently, the domestic insurance industry was 
negatively affected by a lack of capital resources and a high firm mortality ratio.
35
 
In addition to the limitations of the financial system, the Spanish foreign sector 
suffered from a weak international position that resulted in persistent deficits of the 
current account after the middle of the nineteenth century.
36
 Especially in the case of 
services balance, there were only four annual surpluses from 1850 to 1913, while net 
capital inflows declined around the turn of the century.
37
 The extension of this trend 
throughout the next decades deeply affected those industries showing a high presence of 
foreign capital, as was the case of insurance. Moreover, the deterioration of trade and 
the slowdown of the entries of foreign capital deeply affected the position of the 
Spanish currency. In 1883, the Bank of Spain suspended the gold convertibility of the 
peseta, commencing a half-century period in which it performed as a fiat currency at the 
periphery of the gold standard Europe.
38
 Indeed, the changing performance of the 
domestic currency posed several difficulties for the access of Spanish companies to the 
international capital markets. 
 
                                                          
34
 Martín-Aceña, ‘Desarrollo y modernización’. 
35
 Tortella et al., Historia del seguro, 112–3 and Pons, ‘Estrategias de crecimiento’, 14. Pons underlines 
this high mortality ratio as characteristic of the companies established in regional areas in the last decades 
of the century. 
36
 According to Prados, ‘Spain’s International Position’, 190, only from 1890 was there a relatively 
prolonged period of surplus balances, although this trend was broken by the deficits in the period 1900–4. 
37
 Idem, 191. 
38
 See Appendix A.3. For a comparison of the performance of the peseta and the pound sterling in this 
period, see Gadea and Sabaté, ‘The European Periphery’, 64. 
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Figure 3. Aggregated premium income in fire insurance and estimates of service 
imports in fire insurance (million Pesetas, 1928-years price level) in Spain between 
1908 and 1934. 
Note: Estimates on imports of services are calculated as the sum of two components: 1) 
Direct import by branches of foreign companies = Premiums earned by branches of 
foreign companies in Spain – Claims paid; and 2) Net reinsurance abroad = Premiums 
reinsured abroad by domestic companies – Claims covered by reinsurance. Due to the 
lack of data on retrocessions, all reinsurance purchased by domestic companies is 
assumed to be reinsured abroad. 
Sources: Pons, ‘Estrategias de crecimiento’, Appendix 1, and AGA (1) 26 - Cajas I-1 to 
I-141 Top. 13/31 and AGA (1) 26 - Cajas 11/02131 to 11/02180; Comisaría General de 
Seguros, Memoria sobre las entidades de seguros que operan en España, Years 1911, 
1912, 1913, 1915. 
 
Figure 3 shows the estimates on imports of insurance services including net 
reinsurance purchases by Spanish companies and gross premium income in the fire 
branch from 1908 to 1935.
39
 Service imports remained as a key component of fire 
insurance, though its importance on the business came to a standstill after the 
implementation of the 1908 Act. After First World War turbulences, the global 
                                                          
39
 Following the System of National Accounting 2008, insurance and reinsurance transactions are 
recorded in the balance of payments as imports or exports of services. Figure 3 shows a simplified 
approach excluding the net change in reserves, service charges and the adjustment for the volatility of 
claims. 
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environment and the hardening of economic nationalism exacerbated this trend and led 
to the disengagement of foreign companies, especially after 1925. In the same period, 
net reinsurance premiums ceded by Spanish companies remained as a major component, 
providing additional insurance coverage to the fire business: from 1908 to 1930, net 
reinsurance premiums averaged around 20 per cent of total premium income in the fire 
line. While this capital outflow served to enhance the underwriting capacity of Spanish 
insurers, it also exacerbated the Spanish balance of payments deficit.
40
 
In addition to the structural features of the Spanish economy, the insurance 
industry had to face deep institutional changes inspired by the trends of economic 
nationalism. The 1908 Act on Registry and Inscription of insurance companies imposed 
a new legal framework establishing a strict supervision of insurance companies and 
creating an official registry of authorized insurers. To be authorized to sell policies, 
companies were to report their operations to the regulatory agency and comply with the 
requirements concerning reserves and equity capital established in the legislation. In 
practice, the new rules directly affected foreign offices since the obligation to maintain 
their reserves deposited in Spain posed increasing difficulties to their performance.
41
 In 
line with trends in economic nationalism, domestic companies required more public 
control of the operations of foreign insurers, in order to occupy their market share and to 
avoid the outflow of national wealth.
42
 Moreover, the actual nationality of several 
companies registered as Spanish but totally or partially owned by foreign capital 
became a controversial issue, making frequent the appeals for more rigorous 
                                                          
40
 The Bank of Spain’s Studies Service noted this performance in the analysis of the balance of payments 
for 1931: in spite of the difficulties for measuring reinsurance operations, the Service calculated a net 
outflow abroad of more than five million pesetas. Gutiérrez and Pons, ‘Risk management’, 8. 
41
 Pons, ‘Estrategias de crecimiento’, Pons, ‘Influence of foreign companies’, Pons, ‘Multinational 
enterprises’ and Pearson, ‘Growth, organization and diffusion’. Among foreign companies, those 
operating in the fire branch were the most affected. Marine insurance was exempt from the 1908 
Inspection and Registry Act, while life companies had already formed high mathematical reserves in the 
previous decades. 
42
 Pons, ‘Las empresas extranjeras’, 202–3.  
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requirements on nationality classification to avoid the proliferation of false Spanish 
insurers.
43
 
In this scenario, the increasing pressure of the legislation converged with an 
external shock. The outbreak of the First World War and its effects on the international 
market placed Spanish companies between the main suppliers of marine freight and 
insurance.
44
 Many small and undercapitalized companies were established to insure and 
reinsure these risks. Likewise, the great growth of the marine insurance market attracted 
several offices from other lines such as fire. However, the buoyancy of the industry was 
eroded by financial distress. As a consequence, direct insurers resorted profusely to 
foreign reinsurance. The increasing outflows of capital caught the attention of the 
government, which reacted by limiting the reinsurance ratios and forcing the companies 
to cede part of their risks to the Official Committee on War Insurance, a state-dependent 
authority, in order to stop what was seen as the drain of national wealth.
45
  
In Spain, the fragmentation of the international market due to the war and the 
monetary disruptions until 1923 coincided with a post-war crisis, emerging in the 
insurance industry in the form of the liquidation of many small marine and fire insurers 
and reinsurers.
46
 This led to a tightening of the legislation and an increase in financial 
requirements, such as the imposition of the requirements of the 1908 Act on the marine 
branch, and the requirement to invest long-term reserves in Spanish securities.
47
 
Moreover, the increase on the minimum deposits and equity capital required for 
different lines and the stricter limitations on the investment of the reserves led several 
                                                          
43
 Spanish companies formed in 1928 the Federación de Compañías Españolas de Seguros, an 
association inspired by La Equitativa Group to lobby for stricter regulations for foreign companies. For 
more details, see Tortella et al., Historia del seguro, 147–9. 
44
 For further explanation of the impact of the war on the Spanish economy, see Sudriá, ‘Los beneficios 
de España’ and San Román, ‘Las consecuencias pacíficas’. For an analysis of the effects on insurance 
markets, see Gutiérrez, El control de divisas. 
45
 Canals, Cuestiones económicas, Gutiérrez, El control de divisas and Gutiérrez and Pons, ‘Risk 
management’. 
46
 Tortella et al., Historia del seguro and Gutiérrez and Pons, ‘Risk management’, 5–6. 
47
 Royal Decree of 13 August of 1920, Gaceta de Madrid no. 228, 15/08/1920. 
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foreign insurance companies to reduce their operations or even abandon the market, 
especially during 1933 and 1934.
48
 
Despite the financial obstacles, the Spanish insurance sector expanded across all 
lines in the 1920s. In the line of fire, business grew by almost 50% in real terms from 
1920 to 1927.
49
 The expansion took off during the culmination of the process of 
cartelization among joint stock companies with the constitution of the Sindicato 
General de Compañias de Seguros contra Incendios in 1924.
50
 In addition, the Spanish 
insurance industry was affected to a lesser extent by the global depression; the low 
levels of internationalization of the Spanish economy contributed to minimizing the 
impact of the crisis.
51
 In the case of the insurance market, the life insurance industry 
was the most exposed to the financial volatility, but despite this, companies continued 
growing until 1936.
52
 
Nevertheless, this period of growth and development did not end with the main 
imbalances inherited from the nineteenth century. The number of companies 
underwriting business on the fire insurance market almost doubled between 1912 and 
1932, and the mean premiums earned by companies grew by some 80% in real terms 
during the same period.
53
 Thus, domestic companies underwriting on the growing 
Spanish fire insurance market increased their liabilities and leverage between 1908 and 
1936. Unless they had external support, one would have expected that their financial 
position would have declined, making the probability of bankruptcy higher. From a ruin 
                                                          
48
 Pons, ‘Las carteras de valores’, Pearson, ‘Growth, organization and diffusion’ and Pons and Gutiérrez, 
‘Actuarial practices’. The Royal Decree of 18 February of 1927, Gaceta de Madrid no. 50, 19/02/1927, 
raised the minimum equity capital to operate in fire branch at 2 million pesetas, with a minimum 
guarantee deposit of 25%. Finally, the sound protest of foreign companies resulted in the application of 
these new conditions only to those offices registered after the entrance in force of the Royal Decree. Pons, 
‘Multinational enterprises’, 108. 
49
 Pons, ‘Estrategias de crecimiento’, 119. 
50
 Pons, ‘Influence of foreign companies’. 
51
 Bartolomé, Martín-Aceña and Martínez Ruiz, ‘A Spanish tale’. 
52
 Pons, ‘Estrategias de crecimiento’, and Tortella et al., Historia del seguro. 
53
 Pons, ‘Estrategias de crecimiento’, 43–4. 
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theory framework, managers would have had to decide between three approaches in 
order to reduce or keep stable this probability of ruin: (1) improve the performance of 
the portfolio, (2) accumulate capital, or (3) purchase reinsurance.
54
 In the first case, 
managers could increase the net surplus of the portfolio either by raising the price of 
insurance or by increasing low-variance risk contracts. Such a strategy, however, seems 
less likely in a competitive market such as the Spanish one in the period of study. It also 
seems less likely that companies were able to increase the number of low-variance risk 
contracts, which even in the case of avoiding reducing prices would be difficult since, 
according to Deelstra and Plantin, such risks are the most inelastic part of the market. In 
the second option, increasing capital could be a difficult task for Spanish insurance 
companies during this period. Though the financial system had progressed since 1900, a 
lack of diversification or specialization and business instability remained, as did the 
problems of the banking industry, which continued to be the main component of the 
financial system.
55
 These elements obstructed the capitalization of the Spanish 
insurance industry. Indeed, immediately before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, 
the insurance industry showed shortages of capital that resulted in extraordinarily high 
levels of leverage.
56
 Faced with an undercapitalized financial market and a high level of 
liabilities, reinsurance seem to have been more attractive to domestic insurers than 
foreign companies on the expanding Spanish fire insurance market. 
In order to determine whether such a preference was predominant among 
Spanish insurance companies or the outcome of the Spanish insurance market in 
general, the following analysis will focus on the determinants of reinsurance. The 
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 The P/S ratio (premiums earned over surplus) is widely accepted as a valid indicator of leverage. The 
sample of fire insurers used in Kader et al., ‘Determinants of reinsurance’ in the case of Sweden between 
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Dirección General de Seguros for 1942, Gutiérrez, El control de divisas, 48, displays a value for Spain of 
1.741. 
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analysis aims at identifying whether there was a systemic preference for purchasing 
reinsurance based on the country of origin (nationality), or whether reinsurance 
purchase was the outcome of firm-specific conditions. 
 
II 
There are no complete published or edited official statistical series on Spanish 
reinsurance until 1942. The available data for the insurance industry as a whole are the 
annual reports in the Boletín Oficial de Seguros, Boletín Oficial de la Inspección 
Mercantil y Boletín Oficial de Seguros y Ahorro, which include the premiums 
underwritten from 1911 to 1935. Edited information on the premiums reinsured, 
reserves, claims experience, liquidity indicators, and other financial data are only 
available for a few years.
57
 To overcome this lack of statistics, we have collected the 
financial balances sent by companies to the regulation agency after 1908 and currently 
located at the Archivo General de la Administración (AGA).
58
 These include the main 
accounting sheets of the companies: statements of financial positions and profit and loss 
accounts. From these documents we have collected the premiums earned, claims paid, 
reinsured premiums, cash and liquid assets in bank accounts, equity capital declared, 
and ongoing-risks reserves. 
Between 1908 and 1936, there were 117 companies authorized to underwrite fire 
insurance policies in Spain. However, only a third of them operated throughout the 
period without interruption. New entrances and exits from the fire branch as well as 
liquidation processes determined a highly changing scenario in which the total number 
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 Comisaría General de Seguros, Memoria sobre las entidades de seguros que operan en España, 1911, 
1912, 1913, 1915. 
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 AGA (1) 26 - Cajas I1 to I-141 Top. 13/31 and AGA (1) 26 - Cajas 11/02131 to 11/02180. The 
obligation to report their operations was established within the legal framework of the 1908 Inspection 
and Registry Act. Although there are companies reporting after 1908, the standard model of report was 
not defined until 1912. 
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of companies registered for each year varied between 46 in 1912 and 79 in 1934. 
Besides this volatility, there is a great deal of missing data due to different reasons: 
many offices sent incomplete information on their operations; some diversified 
companies reported mixed data from various branches; and, finally, insurers authorized 
to underwrite fire business that were retreating from the branch, or even not selling 
policies, showed abnormally low values for main indicators. Consequently, those entries 
showing a large amount of missing and/or extreme data have been excluded from the 
dataset.  
Our full sample includes 62 insurers distributed along the period 1908–1934 and 
fluctuating from 41 in 1915 to 33 companies in 1931. The years before 1910 and after 
1932 show a clear lack of data from fire insurers, with fewer than 15 companies 
reporting their operations, so these have been analysed separately. As a result, compared 
to the data from Pons, our dataset includes between 80% (in 1912) and 45% (in 1931) of 
total companies authorized for each year.
59
 However, in terms of market share, the 
sample represents no less than 85% of total premiums earned (as we have excluded 
most local companies and small mutual societies with less than 1% of market share).
60
 
Regarding the nationality of the companies, the sample includes 27 Spanish, 15 British, 
ten French, three Swiss, three German companies, and one each from the United States, 
Italy, Denmark, and Portugal.
61
 Among the Spanish companies, we include only three 
mutual societies; despite the number of  this kind of society in the Spanish fire branch, 
most of them operated within a local scope and underwrote only minor amounts of 
business. 
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 For example, Pons, ‘Estrategias de crecimiento’, estimates total fire insurance premiums earned in 
Spain in 1930 at 76.5 million Pesetas, while our sample reaches 73.4 million. 
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 As shown in the first section, the actual nationality of companies was a controversial issue in this 
period. This sample includes three companies with a significant presence of foreign capital: La Unión y el 
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Table 2 includes the main descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) for 
the key variables built from the data collected. Our dependent variable, reinsurance 
(REIN), is expressed as the percentage of reinsured premiums over the total amount of 
premiums earned. With regard to our independent variables, the previous literature has 
stated a positive relation between leverage and the probability of ruin, which, in turn, 
connects it positively with reinsurance.
62
 Though the premium to surplus ratio (P/S) has 
frequently been used as an indicator of leverage in the literature, it shows several 
limitations in our sample.
63
 Several Spanish stock companies showed differences up to 
70% between equity capitals declared and effectively deposited. Mutual societies add 
further heterogeneity, since they have no equity capital. Foreign offices did not declare 
equity capital in Spain because, according to insurance regulations, they received 
financial support from their headquarters.
64
 Searching for a homogeneous indicator, we 
seek a variable expressing the available resources allocated by the company to face the 
liabilities resulting from policies in force. Therefore, we have chosen the ongoing-risks 
reserves as a variable common to all kinds of insurers and one that is only subjected to 
managerial decisions, unlike other statistics strictly marked by legal obligations.  
The Registry Act of 1908 established the minimum amount of ongoing risk 
reserves as one third of written premiums, and the lack of control until the end of each 
exercise let many companies operate during most of the year under this limit, while 
others decided to form larger reserves, always depending on the office strategy.
65
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 Mayers and Smith, ‘Corporate demand for insurance’ and Mayers and Smith, ‘Evidence from 
reinsurance market’. 
63
 P/S ratio is defined as net premiums written over total surplus. Idem, Cole and McCullough, ‘A 
reexamination of the corporate demand’ and Kader et al., ‘Determinants of reinsurance’ used the sum of 
equity and reserves as surplus value.  
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 After several controversies on the issue, the Royal Order of 1st of April of 1913 obliged foreign 
insurers to declare as equity capital the amount corresponding to their head offices. Actually, these sums 
were not deposited in Spain nor they were subjected to Spanish legislation. 
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 See Regulation on the implementation of the Registry Act of 1908, of February 2nd of 1912, in Gaceta 
de Madrid 49, 18/02/1912. The firms in our sample show that the average leverage was too high to meet 
these legal requirements: ongoing risk reserves made up only 25.4% on the written premiums. 
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Consequently, our variable acts as an indicator of the solvency risk of the company and 
as a proxy for partial leverage (LEV), since it is confronting the total business written 
by the insurer to the amount of resources that the managers are willing to tie up in order 
to face eventual liabilities.
66
 LEV is calculated as the percentage of total premiums 
earned over ongoing-risks reserves. 
Given that reinsurance serves to reduce the exposure to unexpected claims, 
previous authors have considered loss ratio to be closely and positively related to 
reinsurance purchases.
67
 In line with this, we use loss ratio (LOSS), expressed as the 
percentage of total claims paid over premiums earned. Plantin argues that insurers with 
fewer liquid assets available are expected to purchase more reinsurance in order to 
overcome their cash-resources constraints.
68
 In our research, liquidity (LIQ) is equal to 
the percentage of total liquid assets (cash and bank accounts) over current liabilities, 
expressed as ongoing reserves. According to the previous literature, size is expected to 
be negatively related to reinsurance, since small companies are more sensitive to 
losses.
69
 We express size (SIZE) as the natural logarithm of total business underwritten. 
Finally, older companies are expected to have a wider knowledge of the market and to 
be more efficient.
70
 In the case of insurance, this experience would appear as a lower 
loss volatility in the risk portfolio; thus, age would be negatively related to reinsurance. 
In this research, age (AGE) is expressed as the total years of operation of the company 
on the Spanish insurance market. 
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Table 2. Fire insurance companies in Spain (1908-1934). Descriptive statistics for firm-
specific variables by nationality and organizational form. Mean and (standard 
deviation). 
 
Sign 
Full 
Sample 
Spanish 
British French Other 
 
All Mutual 
REIN . 
30.21 41.68 82.87 16.26 25.77 41.52 
(24.72) (24.03) (6.21) (16.31) (18.47) (32.66) 
LEV + 
392.77 442.34 650.23 350.53 358.62 414.12 
(202.12) (249.88) (121.29) (131.74) (158.41) (227.32) 
LOSS + 
35.62 31.36 28.64 44.65 34.52 27.50 
(25.26) (18.61) (27.38) (32.95) (20.12) (22.75) 
LIQ - 
114.57 121.35 64.35 120.85 52.84 185.32 
(332.40) (134.50) (34.81) (493.28) (72.86) (466.20) 
SIZE - 
12.30 12.71 12.16 12.17 12.41 11.26 
(1.47) (1.71) (0.36) (1.00) (1.42) (1.14) 
AGE - 
30.07 25.56 20.58 36.65 33.16 18.89 
(20.03) (18.18) (8.31) (24.10) (14.80) (14.98) 
No. of firms 62 27 3 15 10 10 
Note: REIN = Premiums reinsured / Premiums earned, in %; LEV = Premiums earned / 
Ongoing-risks reserves, in %; LOSS = Claims / Premiums earned, in %; LIQ = Cash + 
Bank accounts / Ongoing-risks reserves, in %; SIZE = Natural logarithm of premiums 
earned; AGE = nº of years since the first registration in fire branch in Spain. 
Source: AGA (1) 26 - Cajas I-1 to I-141 Top. 13/31 and AGA (1) 26 - Cajas 11/02131 
to 11/02180; Comisaría General de Seguros, Memoria sobre las entidades de seguros 
que operan en España, Years 1911, 1912, 1913, 1915. 
 
To examine whether reinsurance purchases go beyond that of firm-specific 
characteristics, we have employed nationality as a proxy identifying systematic 
preference. We classify our sample according to nationality (Spanish, British, French, 
and Other), given that we suppose a greater inclination to purchase reinsurance for 
domestic companies facing more of the structural shortcomings of the Spanish financial 
system. Given that foreign companies were integrated into their home country’s capital 
markets, we expect a lower need for reinsurance to overcome financial system 
shortcomings. 
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To identify a preference of reinsurance based on organizational form, we have 
separated mutual societies from joint-stock companies, since previous literature states 
that organizational form has a deep influence on the performance of the risk portfolio.
71
 
According to this, we expect mutual societies to demand more reinsurance than do stock 
companies, as they suffered from capital constraints derived from their lack of equity 
capital. 
Finally, for country-level control variables we consider two macroeconomic 
indicators that are expected to affect reinsurance demand. First, we use the GDP real 
growth (GRTH) from Carreras and Tafunell, Estadísticas históricas, since economic 
growth is expected to increase insurance covering demand, which, in turn, would 
positively affect reinsurance services.
72
 Second, we use the Peseta/French Franc (FF) 
exchange rate in order to measure the monetary effect on the demand for foreign 
reinsurance. Thus, we consider that the lower/higher rate of exchange would 
improve/worsen the position of Spanish insurers in order to purchase foreign 
reinsurance, which would result in higher/lower reinsurance ratios. Between official 
exchange rates, we use the French Franc not only because of the close links with the 
French market but also for its better performance compared to the British Pound, with 
respect to other macro indicators such as inflation and legal interest rates. 
As shown in Table 2, the mean reinsured portion of risks in the Spanish fire 
insurance industry reached almost 30% of the business. However, looking at the 
standard deviation, there were substantial differences within the sector. Organizing the 
data according to nationality it can be seen that, as we expected, Spanish companies 
purchased more reinsurance than did British or French ones. Certainly, these offices 
                                                          
71
 Prieto, El reaseguro: función económica, Pearson, ‘Development of reinsurance’, Adams, ‘The 
reinsurance decision’ and Kader et al., ‘Determinants of reinsurance’. 
72
 We use GDP data at market prices and the main price index, both by Prados de la Escosura, in Carreras 
and Tafunell, Estadísticas históricas, 1291; 1331. 
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would have access to the financial support of their mother companies, which in turn had 
direct contact with more capitalized financial markets. Leverage shows a similar trend, 
with Spanish companies reaching higher values than British and French ones, and 
mutual societies surpassing the rest.  
Companies from other countries are rather heterogeneous and include only a few 
companies of each origin. Danish, US, Italian, and Portuguese companies showed stable 
values next to the full sample mean levels for reinsurance and leverage. However, 
German companies presented much higher values: reinsurance ratios oscillated from 60 
to 95% after the outbreak of the First World War and during the monetary distortions of 
the 1920s, while leverage in this period in the case of Nord Deutsche was no lower than 
600. Finally, Swiss companies displayed an interesting asymmetry: while leverage 
levels remain between 200 and 300 for all companies – that is, lower than the rest of the 
sample – reinsurance ratios varied from the approximately 55% of La Baloise to the 8% 
of La Federale. This could be explained as a Swiss anomaly, since these companies had 
direct access to a highly efficient capital market and, at the same time, can be expected 
to have been in close contact with one of the most advanced reinsurance markets in the 
world. In this scenario, the decision to reinsure would not arise from a financial 
necessity, but from a managerial decision related to other elements. For example, the 
low rates of retention of La Baloise could be explained with the tight links the company 
had with the reinsurance industry: certainly, the office was very close to the Basler 
Handelbank, which was one of the main shareholders and founding member of Swiss 
Re.
73
 As a consequence of this high heterogeneity, we include these companies in the 
full sample, but not as a separate analysis group. 
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Regarding the Spanish, British, and French companies, the figures indicate a 
positive correlation between reinsurance and leverage, despite a high dispersion of 
values. With regard to loss ratio indicators, one can see that British and French fire 
insurance companies had high figures compared to the Spanish ones (and the other 
nationalities). Figures on volatility show that British insurers especially faced great 
variations in loss ratio. A close examination shows that most jumps in the loss ratio are 
attributed to two kinds of extreme values: those produced by abnormally low figures for 
premiums earned due to entering or exiting the market, as in the case of Legal and 
General and General Accident and Fire; but also six entrances corresponding to 
catastrophic losses during 1909, 1912 and 1914. Liquidity indicators show the 
managerial practices of foreign insurers that would keep minimum resources in the 
country in order to maximize the returns of their investment in the host market, while 
Spanish companies displayed a somewhat greater preference for maintaining liquid 
assets. However, both groups are highly heterogeneous, as indicated by standard 
deviation values. With regard to size, it shows homogeneous values for all nationalities, 
while in the case of age there are large internal deviations inside groups and differences 
between nationalities in favour of foreign companies, which could balance the levels of 
market knowledge for different countries of origin. Finally, as a cross variable, data on 
mutual societies have been separated from the Spanish sample. As shown in the table, 
these societies are the most prone to use reinsurance, but are also those with higher 
levels of leverage and lower levels of liquidity. In parallel, their loss ratios are below the 
mean of the market and they are among the youngest companies operating in the fire 
branch. 
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III 
To empirically examine the determinants of reinsurance, we have employed a panel data 
approach. Since one of the key variables (nationality) is time-invariant, we start with a 
basic random-effects model, using the following regression equation:   
REINit = α + ∑ β Xit + β Yt + β Ut + β Vt + εit 
where REINit is the ratio of reinsured premiums of company i in year t; Xit represents the 
nationality of the company (NATSP for Spanish; NATUK for British; NATFR for 
French); Yt refers to organizational form (OF); Ut is the vector of macro variables 
including exchange rate (EXCH) and GDP growth in real terms (GRTH); and Vt is the 
vector of firm-specific variables including LEV, LOSS, LIQ, SIZE and AGE. 
To identify the pairwise relation across the variables employed in our analysis, 
we build a correlation coefficient matrix including nationality, organizational form, 
country-level data, and firm-specific indicators so as to identify the sign, intensity, and 
statistical significance of the pairwise relations between variables. As shown in Table 3, 
nationality and organizational form have a significant correlation with reinsurance: 
Spanish companies are expected to reinsure more than British ones, while mutual 
societies are more prone to purchase reinsurance than are stock companies. With regard 
to macroeconomic variables, GDP growth has an insignificant impact on reinsurance, 
while exchange rate shows a significant negative correlation, as hypothesized.  
Firm-specific variables perform in diverse ways. Leverage is significantly and 
positively correlated with reinsurance, as predicted. Loss ratio shows a weak but 
statistically significant inverse correlation with reinsurance, which is contradictory to 
the risk aversion framework. As we expected, age is significantly and inversely 
correlated with reinsurance, while size and, especially liquidity, have less impact. 
Regarding correlations between independent variables, nationality indicators show the 
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highest (and most negative) levels, since they are mutually incompatible. In parallel, 
organizational form shows a significant correlation with Spanish nationality, given that 
all mutual societies included in the sample are Spanish. In the group of macroeconomic 
variables, there is a significant and negative correlation between growth and exchange 
rate. 
Firm-specific variables are highly correlated: concretely, leverage is 
significantly correlated to liquidity, age, and size, which in turn shows a significant 
correlation with liquidity and age. Although the coefficient values are below 0.5, low 
significance and the multiple relations between firm-specific variables limit their use 
due to multicollinearity. Certainly, despite the , initially observed ,high correlation of 
leverage with reinsurance and the statements in the previous literature, the 
interconnections between variables pose restrictions that severely limit its explanatory 
power and fit in the model. In addition, leverage shows a problem of causality: the 
results do not allow a determination of whether high levels of leverage make companies 
reinsure more or whether companies using more reinsurance underwrite more risks and, 
in turn, raise their leverage. In contrast, size seems to capture a large fraction of the 
variation in all other independent variables; consequently, it can take on a “catchall” 
variable for firm characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
  
. Table 3. Reinsurance determinants in fire insurance market (1908-1934). Correlation coefficients matrix. 
 
REIN NATSP NATUK NATFR ORG EXCH GRTH LEV LOSS LIQ SIZE 
NATSP .338
a
 1 - - - - - - - - - 
NATUK -.405
a
 -.455
a
 1 - - - - - - - - 
NATFR -.066 -.404
a
 -.386
a
 1 - - - - - - - 
ORG .294
a
 .170
a
 -.077
b
 -.068
b
 1 - - - - - - 
EXCH -.107
a
 -.028 .059 -.020 -.098
a
 1 - - - - - 
GRTH .015 .005 .018 -.003 -.009 -.202
a
 1 - - - - 
LEV .329
a
 .183
a
 -.131
a
 -.090
b
 .176
b
 -.171
b
 -.035 1 - - - 
LOSS -.229
a
 -.123
b
 .212
b
 -.015 .040 .038 -.009 -.090
b
 1 - - 
LIQ .141
a
 .275
a
 -.189
a
 -.130
a
 -.021 .107
a
 -.078
b
 .160
a
 -.056 1 - 
SIZE .094
b
 .194
a
 -.058 .046 -.011 -.128
b
 -.009 .369
a
 .044 -.266
b
 1 
AGE -.161
a
 -.176
a
 .219
a
 .109
a
 -.135
a
 -.144
a
 .019 .113
a
 .076
b
 -.074 .470
a
 
a, b Statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels 
Note: REIN = Premiums reinsured / Premiums earned, in %; NTSP = 1 for Spanish, 0 for other; NTUK = 1 for British, 0 for other; NTFR = 1 for 
French, 0 for other; ORG = 1for mutual, 0 for stock company; EXCH = Official exchange rate of Peseta / 100 French Francs (FF); GRTH = % 
rate of GDP growth in real terms; LEV = Premiums earned / Ongoing-risks reserves, in %; LOSS = Claims / Premiums earned, in %; LIQ = Cash 
+ Bank accounts / Ongoing-risks reserves, in %; SIZE = Natural logarithm of premiums earned; AGE = nº of years since the first official 
registration in fire branch in Spain. 
Source: AGA (1) 26 - Cajas I-1 to I-141 Top. 13/31 and AGA (1) 26 - Cajas 11/02131 to 11/02180; Comisaría General de Seguros, Memoria 
sobre las entidades de seguros que operan en España, Years 1911, 1912, 1913, 1915. 
 
  
We thus use two different explanatory models, using nationality and 
organizational forms separately. Both are combined with exchange rate and the main set 
of firm-specific indicators, namely: leverage, loss ratio, liquidity, and size. We use these 
firm-specific indicators in order to control for individual differences not captured by 
non-firm-specific variables. Two variables from the initial dataset have been dropped: 
age, due to its high positive correlation with size, which is consistent with the literature; 
and growth, since it shows no impact on any variable. In order to utilize the most 
appropriate model, we have run specification tests. A Hausman test showed that the 
unobserved heterogeneity was important, and that a fixed-effects model that accounts 
for unobserved firm-specific influences was appropriate. One disadvantage of a fixed-
effects estimator is that the influence of time-invariant variables may to some extent be 
included in the firm-specific fixed effects and not actually attributed to the respective 
variable. Unfortunately, this could be the case for most of the independent variables in 
our analysis.  
To control for the robustness of the outcome with regard to the specification 
applied, we have run both random effects and fixed effects, along with between 
estimators. Comparing the results across specifications, only minor differences arise. 
The comparison between fixed-effects and random-effects models shows that the 
influence of exchange rate and size remains at the same level when unobserved 
interactions are removed, given that coefficients for both models display differences 
below 10% (see Appendix 1). With respect to between estimators, nationality holds its 
influence for both the Spanish and British cases. As expected, exchange rate has no 
significant influence since it is a country-level indicator that affects all companies 
equally, so it cannot explain variations between firms. According to Wooldridge, this 
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would allow for the assumption of a minimum impact of unobserved influences, so we 
can use the random-effects estimators to measure the impact of nationality.
74
  
Table 4 shows the determinants of reinsurance demand, estimated using a 
random-effects model including the different nationalities as a variable. The random-
effects models confirm the role of nationality as a statistically significant determinant of 
reinsurance practices. While the French and Other nationalities have no significance in 
the model, both Spanish (NATSP) and British (NATUK) show p-values below 0.005. 
As we expected, NATSP is positively related with the dependent variable, meaning that 
Spanish companies are more prone to reinsure. According to the figures, the influence 
of nationality is continuous and increases over the period. The estimated coefficient for 
the full period shows that domestic Spanish companies reinsured on average 22% more 
than other nationalities. To make a rough comparison of the estimate on the time-
invariant variable, the random-effects estimate of nationality is compared with the 
fixed-effects term aggregated by nationality. It is shown that the estimated fixed term by 
nationality also shows a 22% higher reinsurance share for companies with Spanish 
nationality compared to non-Spanish companies (see Appendix 2).   
Within our ruin theory framework, this inclination connects directly with the 
main features of the financial system and the fire insurance market in Spain: in a period 
of market growth, companies operating in Spain would have few options.
75
 Firstly, the 
shortcomings of the low diversified financial system posed obstacles to the access to 
new capital resources for Spanish insurance companies, while French and British 
companies benefited from their links with their mother offices and, in turn, with highly  
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Table 4. Reinsurance determinants in fire insurance market (1908-1934). Random effect linear regression models with nationality, exchange 
rate and firm-specific variables.  
 Spanish  British 
 1908-34 1908-19 1915-9 1920-9 1920-34  1908-34 1908-19 1915-9 1920-9 1920-34 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
NAT* 
21.459
a 
14.482
b 
21.206
a 
26.655
a 
29.184
a 
 -22.480
a 
-20.414
a 
-25.455
a 
-25.747
a 
-27.159
a 
(5.429) (6.908) (7.897) (6.013) (5.707)  (6.098) (6.295) (6.567) (6.633) (6.678) 
EXCH 
-7.242
a 
-23.897
a 
-41.319
a 
-11.279
a 
-5.562
c 
 -7.116
a 
-23.829
a 
-39.644
a 
-10.913
a 
-5.262
 
(1.718) (5.545) (11.591) (3.386) (3.659)  (1.719) (5.522) (11.509) (3.394) (3.666) 
LEV 
0.001 -0.009 0.021
c 
0.001 0.002  0.001 -0.008 0.025
b 
0.001 0.002 
(0.005) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) 
LOSS 
-0.023 -0.019 0.053 0.009 -0.021  -0.022 -0.015 0.055 0.009 -0.022 
(0.019) (0.031) (0.043) (0.020) (0.020)  (0.019) (0.031) (0.043) (0.020) (0.019) 
LIQ 
0.010 0.009 0.028
b 
-0.008 -0.012  0.011
b 
0.010 0.031
b 
0.009 -0.012 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009)  (0.006) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) 
SIZE 
-4.287
a 
-6.907
a 
-6.853
a 
-4.862
a 
-1.646
c 
 -4.185
a 
-6.536
a 
-5.703
a 
-4.673
a 
-1.470
 
(0.947) (1.850) (2.221) (1.135) (1.076)  (0.948) (1.761) (1.994) (1.142) (1.093) 
Const. 
79.083
a 
131.906
a 
127.615
a 
84.388
a 
42.743
a 
 92.823
a 
138.725
a 
126.693
a 
100.833
a 
60.131
a 
(11.882) (23.267) (30.922) (14.015) (13.145)  (12.035) (23.161) (29.171) (14.240) (13.425) 
R
2
            
within 0.067 0.172 0.219 0.127 0.028  0.066 0.168 0.202 0.127 0.028 
between 0.151 0.009 0.193 0.215 0.349  0.141 0.094 0.361 0.166 0.250 
overall 0.109 0.008 0.193 0.158 0.220  0.122 0.053 0.305 0.119 0.198 
* NATSP for Spanish and NATUK for British companies. 
a, b, c
 Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Note: EXCH = Official exchange rate of Peseta / 100 French Francs (FF); LEV = Premiums earned / Ongoing-risks reserves, in %; LOSS = 
Claims / Premiums earned, in %; LIQ = Cash + Bank accounts / Ongoing-risks reserves, in %; SIZE = Natural logarithm of premiums 
earned. 
Source: AGA (1) 26 - Cajas I-1 to I-141 Top. 13/31 and AGA (1) 26 - Cajas 11/02131 to 11/02180; Comisaría General de Seguros, Memoria 
sobre las entidades de seguros que operan en España, Years 1911, 1912, 1913, 1915. 
  
developed capital markets.
76
 Secondly, the structure of the Spanish fire insurance 
market, with a cartel of stock companies competing against mutual societies, and a wide  
group of domestic insurers lobbying against foreign offices, would not have allowed the 
raising of prices.
77
 Consequently, Spanish companies would have used reinsurance as 
the only possible response to the sustained growth of the insurance market, due to the 
chronic lack of capitalization and the rigidities of the financial system. In other words, it 
could be said that reinsurance became a key device for the growth and development of 
the Spanish fire insurance market. In contrast to this performance, the negative sign in 
the coefficient for NATUK would indicate the reluctance of British companies to 
purchase reinsurance. Certainly, the contact British branches had with their headquarters 
would provide them with direct access to the efficient British capital market. 
Consequently, the only remaining motive for British companies to reinsure would be in 
order to reduce underwriting risks.
78
 
In parallel, exchange rate impacts on reinsurance operations in such a way that 
the increase/decrease of the rate, which results in the decrease/increase of the 
purchasing power of the Peseta, makes companies purchase less/more reinsurance 
abroad. This impact was especially strong during the First World War, when the value 
of the main European currencies dropped drastically. In fact, despite the high inflation 
rates suffered in Spain, the monetary effects of the war resulted in a 32% fall of the 
French Franc exchange rate from 1914 to 1919, while the British Pound dropped 27% 
(See Appendix 3). However, the monetary disorders during the 1920s show much less 
influence on Spanish reinsurance practices, as the links with the German market were 
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 Malo de Molina and Martín-Aceña, The Spanish Financial System. 
77
 Pons, ‘Multinational enterprises’, 108, and Tortella et al., Historia del seguro. The third option 
proposed by Deelstra and Plantin would be the increase of low-variance risks contracts, which would not 
be a real option since these kinds of risks are a minority on the market. 
78
 A third motivation analysed by previous literature, the use of reinsurance as a method of 
internationalization, would not be relevant in this context, since most British companies had been 
established in Spain for decades in the period of study. 
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very weak. With regard to size, it comprises a statistically significant impact on 
reinsurance (p-value < 0.001): as stated in the previous literature, small companies 
purchased more reinsurance so as to increase their presence on the market without 
accumulating new capital resources. Furthermore, they are more sensitive to loss 
volatility since their ratio of liabilities over assets is higher.
79
 In addition, the 
characteristic of this variable as a “catchall” for the variations in the rest of the firm-
specific variables contributes to its high significance (see Appendix 4). Finally, the 
other firm-specific variables show no significance in our model, as they are affected by 
the aforementioned multicollinearity problems.  
In relation to the role of organizational form, the Hausman test was not 
statistically significant (p-value > 0.010), indicating that a random-effects model was 
more appropriate. Table 5 displays the second set of estimators applied over a sample 
restricted to Spanish companies. The performance of organizational form shows a 
strong and positive impact in the use of reinsurance (p-values < 0.005). This is 
consistent with the previous literature: mutual societies purchased more reinsurance 
than did stock companies, since they suffered from extra capital constraints due to their 
lack of equity capital.
80
 In the case of Spanish mutual societies, this tendency to reinsure 
has been noted as a growth strategy in individual cases like Mutua General de 
Seguros.
81
 According to the results, this was likely a common practice in property 
insurance, in such a way that mutual societies collected high commissions and kept their 
position in the local markets, where they operated through an intense use of reinsurance. 
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 Mayers and Smith, ‘Evidence from reinsurance market’, Adams, ‘The reinsurance decision’, Adiel, 
‘Reinsurance’ and Dickson and Waters, ‘Reinsurance and ruin’. 
80
 Pearson, ‘Development of reinsurance’, noted the use of reinsurance as a way for small stock 
companies and mutual societies to increase their market share, while Adams et al., ‘Mutuality’, Adams et 
al., ‘Competing models’, Kader et al, ‘Determinants of reinsurance’ and Lilljegren and Andersson, 
‘Variation in organizational form’ found that Swedish mutual societies were less prone to reinsure since 
they were relatively less exposed to unexpectedly high losses. 
81
 Gutiérrez and Pons, ‘Risk management’. 
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Table 5. Reinsurance determinants in Spanish fire insurance companies (1908-1934). 
Random effect linear regression with organizational form, exchange rate and firm-
specific variables. 
 
(1) (2) 
ORG 
41.378
a
 
(12.205) 
35.302
a
 
(13.108) 
FALSE 
14.100
c 
(7.262) 
12.702
c 
(7.404) 
EXCH 
-15.578
a
 -15.880
a
 
(2.840) (2.996) 
LEV 
 0.016
b 
 (0.008) 
LOSS 
 0.068 
 (0.046) 
LIQ 
 -0.009 
 (0.008) 
SIZE 
-3.407
b 
-4.985
a
 
(1.501) (1.702) 
Const. 
88.492
a
 100.606
a
 
(20.003) (22.382) 
R
2
   
within 0.136 0.172 
between 0.394 0.425 
overall 0.195 0.232 
a, b, c
 Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Note: ORG = 1 for mutual, 0 for stock company; FALSE =1 if false Spanish company, 0 
othervise; EXCH = Official exchange rate of Peseta / 100 French Francs (FF); GRTH = % rate 
of GDP growth in real terms; LEV = Premiums earned / Ongoing-risks reserves, in %; LOSS 
= Claims / Premiums earned, in %; LIQ = Cash + Bank accounts / Ongoing-risks reserves, in 
%; SIZE = Natural logarithm of premiums earned. 
Source: AGA (1) 26 - Cajas I-1 to I-141 Top. 13/31 and AGA (1) 26 - Cajas 11/02131 to 
11/02180; Comisaría General de Seguros, Memoria sobre las entidades de seguros que operan 
en España, Years 1911, 1912, 1913, 1915. 
 
To control for the potential effect of foreign governed Spanish companies, we 
included a dummy for ‘false Spanish companies’. The impact of foreign governance on 
reinsurance was statistically significant and positive in both models. However, the 
performance of the three false Spanish companies included in our sample requires 
further explanation. Numancia was included in a group of German-owned capital with 
others offices such as Plus Ultra, which operated in the transport branch. In the second 
case, Hispania was founded in 1902 by investors from Catalonia in order to sell work-
accident insurance policies. In 1911, it began operations in the fire line but, three years 
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later, it was bought by the Swiss Zurich. Attempting to specialise the company in the 
work-accident line, the new managers assumed the policies in force, and in 1916 left the 
fire branch. As a result, most of the business in 1914, 1915 and 1916 was reinsured to 
Zurich.
82
 Finally, La Unión y el Fénix Español was constituted with a 58.22% of non-
Spanish capital, though it was declining over the following decades.
83
 In parallel 
though, the company maintained a special agency in Paris whose direct business was 
devoted to the Spanish market. Additionally, the financial sources of the company were 
based in Spain, showing close relations with the Banco de España and, during the 
1920s, with the Banco Hipotecario de España. In this way, the special reinsurance 
performance could be related not to its foreign shareholders, but to its role as the 
gateway to foreign reinsurance for a substantial share of Spanish insurers.
84
 Supporting 
the results obtained in the model presented in Table 4, exchange rate holds a significant 
and negative correlation with reinsurance purchases. As regards firm-specific variables, 
size is again the only one with a statistically significant impact on reinsurance (at the 
5% level in the complete model). In contrast, leverage, loss ratio, and liquidity show no 
significance within the model. 
Taking into account the results shown in both models, reinsurance seems to be a 
widely used device by Spanish companies in order to enhance their underwriting 
capacity. In fact, controlling for firm-specific variables and paying attention to variable 
coefficients (Table 4), this indicates that Spanish nationality holds a strong preference 
for reinsurance. In view of the differences derived from nationality regarding access to 
capital resources, this strong systematic preference could be considered to be due to the 
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 Gutiérrez and Pons, ‘Risk management’, 6–9, describes this role and connects it to the international 
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contribution of foreign reinsurance as a funding provider to enhance the underwriting 
capacity on the undercapitalized Spanish insurance market. 
Furthermore, the financial role of reinsurance as a key element in the 
development of the Spanish insurance market connects with other dimensions noted in 
the previous literature and related to market structuring and internationalization 
management. It seems clear that, as stated in the previous literature, reinsurance served 
as the main channel for small local companies and mutual societies to participate in a 
dense network managed by big companies, such as La Unión y el Fénix Español, 
capable of covering local risks by using their interregional and even international 
underwriting capacity.
85
 Certainly, reinsurance played a major role in the globalization 
of Spanish risks, but also in the strategy of internationalizing Spanish offices such as La 
Unión y el Fénix Español. Following the procedure of British companies like Phoenix 
Assurance, analysed by Trebilcock and Kobrak, this company used reinsurance so as to 
break into new markets such as France, Italy, Belgium and the United States.
86
 
 
IV 
Knowledge and technology transfer benefitted insurance providers in continental 
Europe. The development of new devices like reinsurance allowed them to deal with 
larger risks and with financial constraints. Certainly, as an imperfect substitute for 
capital, reinsurance enhanced underwriting capacity and acted as a funding provider for 
insurers. Simultaneously, reinsurers built wide networks of risk exchange which, in 
turn, contributed to modernizing peripheral latecomers. 
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 Idem. For the case of Phoenix, see Trebilcock, Phoenix Assurance, Kobrak, ‘USA: International 
attraction’. 
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In the Spanish case, the insurance industry developed quickly together with the 
rest of the economy from 1870 to the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936. Foreign 
investment and new management focuses contributed to the growth of the industry. 
However, the scarcity of capital resources and the undercapitalization issue remained 
the main shortcomings on the Spanish insurance market throughout the period. 
Systemic imbalances and rigidities, as well as a lack of diversification in the financial 
system, defined an insurance industry affected by capital constraints and high levels of 
leverage. 
According to the empirical results, reinsurance played a key role in avoiding 
these shortcomings as an enhancer of the underwriting capacity of domestic insurers 
and, in parallel, as a device for dealing with undercapitalization issues. As expected, 
nationality and organizational form operated as high-impact factors defining reinsurance 
strategies. Certainly, when controlling for firm-specific variables, we note that the 
performance of Spanish insurers relied heavily on their access to the reinsurance 
market, as they were significantly more prone to reinsure than were British and French 
offices. In contrast to foreign companies, and taking into account the differences related 
to nationality regarding the access to capital markets, reinsurance served as a major 
source of capital funding for domestic insurers. These findings are consistent with 
previous studies dealing with the organization of reinsurance flows in Spain and the 
links between local markets and global networks. In this sense, our study contributes by 
empirically testing the impact of reinsurance on undercapitalized and developing 
economies, and by offering a quantitative measure of this influence on the 
modernization and development of the insurance market. 
Our analysis further suggests that around 20% of the underwriting capacity on 
the undercapitalized Spanish insurance market was supplied by foreign reinsurance 
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networks. We show that the provision of foreign capital was a necessity to keep pace 
with the demand arising from the process of capital formation; fire insurance meet a 
critical need in both improving financial protection (collateral) and mitigating 
indemnity of losses due to unexpected risks. However, the capital import may have 
exacerbated the balance of payment difficulties unless the productivity growth 
following the reinforced capital formation was strong enough to balance by greater 
commodity export.  
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A.1. Reinsurance determinants in Spanish fire insurance market (1908-1934). Random, fixed and between-effects linear regression models with 
nationality, exchange rate and firm-specific variables.  
 Spanish British French Other 
  RE FE BE RE FE BE RE FE BE RE FE BE 
NAT* 
21.696
a
 
- 
16.088
a 
-22.583
a
 
- 
-15.242
b 
-6.092 
- 
-5.329 0.452 
- 
-0.462 
(5.448) (6.156) (6.128) (7.000) (7.728) (7.994) (8.381) (8.560) 
EXCH 
-7.218
a
 -8.031
a
 -8.966 -7.087
a
 -8.031
a
 -9.548 -7.084
a
 -8.031
a
 -13.614 -7.182
a 
-8.032
a 
-14.992 
(1.721) (1.750) (11.688) (1.721) (1.751) (11.942) (1.734) (1.751) (12.334) (1.738) (1.751) (12.387) 
LEV 
0.001 -0.039 0.027
c 
0.002 -0.004 0.034
b 
0.002 -0.004 0.033
b 
0.002 -0.004
 
0.035
b 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) 
LOSS 
-0.022 -0.016 -0.596
a 
-0.021 -0.017 -0.501
b 
-0.023 -0.017 -0.684
a 
-0.023 -0.017 -0.679
a 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.193) (0.019) (0.019) (0.211) (0.019) (0.018) (0.203) (0.019) (0.019) (0.208) 
LIQ 
0.017 0.026 -0.101 0.019 0.026 -0.065 0.023 0.026 -0.027 0.023 0.027 -0.016 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.083) (0.018) (0.019) (0.081) (0.018) (0.187) (0.083) (0.019) (0.019) (0.082) 
SIZE 
-4.422
a
 -4.836
a
 -1.094 -4.309
a
 -4.837
a
 -0.489 -4.177
a
 -4.836
a
 0.845 -4.219
a 
-4.837
a 
0.697 
(0.945) (1.032) (2.327) (0.947) (1.033) (2.331) (0.959) (1.032) (2.367) (0.964) (1.033) (2.419) 
Const. 
80.425
a
 95.817
a
 57.333
b 
94.110
a
 95.817
a
 54.043 87.447
a
 95.817
a
 43.277 86.832
a 
95.818
a 
43.950 
(11.949) (12.949) (28.374) (12.120) (12.949) (28.822) (12.110) (12.949) (29.614) (12.349) (12.949) (31.459) 
R
2
             
within 0.063 0.066 0.002 0.063 0.066 0.002 0.062 0.066 0.003 0.063 0.066 0.003 
between 0.154 0.002 0.443 0.141 0.003 0.422 0.007 0.003 0.372 0.002 0.003 0.366 
overall 0.107 0.015 0.159 0.118 0.015 0.190 0.001 0.015 0.102 0.003 0.015 0.102 
* NATSP for Spanish, NATUK for British, NATFR for French companies and NATOTHER for the rest. 
a, b, c
 Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Note: EXCH = Official exchange rate of Peseta / 100 French Francs (FF); LEV = Premiums earned / Ongoing-risks reserves, in %; LOSS = 
Claims / Premiums earned, in %; LIQ = Cash + Bank accounts / Premiums earned, in %; SIZE = Natural logarithm of premiums earned. 
Source: AGA (1) 26 - Cajas I-1 to I-141 (Top. 13/31) and AGA (1) 26 - Cajas 11/02131 to 11/02180; Comisaría General de Seguros, Memoria 
sobre las entidades de seguros que operan en España, Years 1911, 1912, 1913, 1915. 
  
A.2. T-test on fixed effects term by Spanish nationality. 
 N Mean (Standard Error) 
NATSP = 0 424 
-7.845 
(0.931) 
NATSP = 1 233 
14.276 
(1.467) 
Combined 657 
0.000 
(0.895) 
t = -13.3126 P (T > t) = 0.000 Diff. 
-22.120 
(1.662) 
Source: AGA (1) 26 - Cajas I-1 to I-141 Top. 13/31 and AGA (1) 26 - Cajas 
11/02131 to 11/02180; Comisaría General de Seguros, Memoria sobre las entidades 
de seguros que operan en España, Years 1911, 1912, 1913, 1915. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.3. Exchange rates of Spanish Peseta to French Franc and British Pound. 
 
Source: Barciela, Carreras and Tafunell (eds.), Estadísticas históricas de España, 704-5. 
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A.4. SIZE as dependent of the rest of firm-specific variables. Random-effects and 
fixed-effects models. 
 Fixed-effects model Random-effects model 
LEV 
0.0016
a 
(0.0002) 
0.0016
a
 
(0.0002) 
LOSS 
0.0021
b 
(0.0007) 
0.0021
b
 
(0.0007) 
LIQ 
-0.0045
a 
(0.0007) 
-0.0047
a
 
(0.0007) 
AGE 
0.0428
a 
(0.0030) 
0.0418
a 
(0.0028) 
Const. 
10.6717
a 
(0.1029) 
10.6358
a
 
(0.1659) 
R
2 
 
within 0.427 0.426 
between 0.374 0.376 
overall 0.376 0.378 
a, b, 
Statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels. 
Note: LEV = Premiums earned / Ongoing-risks reserves, in %; LOSS = Claims / 
Premiums earned, in %; LIQ = Cash + Bank accounts / Premiums earned, in %. 
Source: AGA (1) 26 - Cajas I-1 to I-141 Top. 13/31 and AGA (1) 26 - Cajas 
11/02131 to 11/02180; Comisaría General de Seguros, Memoria sobre las entidades 
de seguros que operan en España, Years 1911, 1912, 1913, 1915. 
